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Tbere are two basic issues in tbis essay. The first is tbe sloppy use of tbe term
'postmodernism' to designate a more or less organised collection of unsavoury
academics, who (it is argued) subscribe to various forms of nihilism and epistemo-
logical hypochondria for some, as-yet-to-be-determined but clearly nefarious,
ends. The exact composition of this group is left vague (although the author
clearly has bis own list). It presumably includes a fair sampling of theorists of the
French persuasion, most feminists, authors who are interested in the entwining of
power and knowledge in human life, and nearly all 'relativists' who reject monistic
certainty. For Aya, the term clearly saves time, basically by assuring himself that
there has been little really worth reading in the social sciences (at least in anthro-
pology) for the past quarter century or so.
The more serious issue in this paper, though, is a slippery slope argument,
equating any contextual partialness in understanding knowledge in the human
sciences with the abandonment of any claim to science as such, logically leading
to only individual maps of the world that are only ever able to be provisionally
coordinated with one another. Moreover, to the extent that the triumph of tbe
nefarious forces of 'postmodernism' is a recent one for the author, one senses a
certain nostalgia for an earlier moment in the discipline. Everything was going
along swimmingly in some golden age (presumably when everyone was hunting
for segmentary lineage systems and G.P. Murdock was first putting together the
Human Relations Area Files) until the academic barbarians stormed the ramparts
and made camp in anthropology.
Both of these positions are based on a foundational assumption of the author;
that the abandonment of final certainty leads inevitably to epistemological ruin
and subjectivism. This is stated most directly, if not elegantly, about halfway
through the piece.
What these statements say about themselves is that they are not true but 'partial,' that
is, relative to group opinion - they say they are folkloric, conventional, tendentious,
partisan, ideological, arbitrary, sophistic, parochial, or credulous -so they say they are
false. And saying they are false, they contradict themselves - so they are logically
false, [p. 31; also look at the overlong endnote in the next paragraph]
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Rough translation: once the camel's nose of interpretive engagement was let into
the tent, it was only a matter of time before the hump of epistemological nihilism
followed, bringing down the whole structure, making a nonsense of terms like
'truth' and 'reality'. Folks like Geertz, who welcomed the nose but later expressed
reservations about some of the rest of the beast, did not have a leg to stand on
because they helped dig the ground out from under everything decades ago.
Unfortunately, after the camel went through it, from the door of our tent, we could
no longer see very much.
Such an argument can only be made on the most partial reading of anthropology
and related disciplines, as well as a very truncated sense of intellectual history. It
ignores a critique of positivism (going back to at least Dilthey in the human
sciences, but existing before him in hermeneutical approaches to the Bible) that
long preceded 'postmodernism'. It conflates the idea of the limits to human cer-
tainty and the role of consensus in how knowledge of the world is put together - an
idea that goes back to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding - with a
strawman, willy-nilly notion of group and individual fashion.' Even the slippery
slope argument tendered here - once you allow social construction and partialness
into epistemology, maybe even ontology, then all bets are off for rigour, never mind
certainty - also bas at least a century-long pedigree, that is, tbe fundamentalist
critique of hermeneutics. In other words, authors who long preceded 'postmod-
ernism' have held positions doubting the universality of rational scientific thought
or questioning the idea of a monistic 'truth' in a fashion that the author would
clearly find worrisome (think of E.B. Tylor in 'Images and Names' from The Early
History of Mankind, or William James's central thesis in Varieties of Religious
Experience, the enormous corpus of Boas and Sapir in at least the American version
of the discipline, never mind the very sticky debates about what constitutes 'truth'
in science as such, from C. S. Pierce to Bruno Latour and beyond.)
Such intellectual history, however, is eschewed by the author in favour of a
summary of recent debates, read as tendentiously as possible. Sokal's 'hoax' and
the Freeman/Mead debate make their inevitable appearance. Here is where
partialness in citing and deploying sources moves into the realm of something
approaching mischief. I have little more than an interested observer status to the
Sokal affair. It seems to me, however, that Sokal was attacking a mode of repre-
senting certain ideas as much as the ideas themselves. And, for all the hurt feelings
and bruised egos that resulted, the exchanges around the hoax generated some
light as well as the inevitable heat. The author's reading of Freeman's 'contribution'
to modern anthropology, though, cannot go unanswered. Freeman's attack on
Mead's Samoa (1983,1999) work now has 20 years of critical commentary attached
to it, a substantial portion of which is far from persuaded by either Freeman's facts
or his arguments, practically none of which is cited by the author. The best sum-
mary to my mind is one of the early pieces, Roy Rappaport's, 'Desecrating the
Holy Woman,' which, while not uncritical of Mead's pioneering work, also takes
Freeman to task for ignoring the social and intellectual location of ethnographic
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knowledge, the different colonial and mission histories of Samoa, and developments
(as well as the social and political contexts) in anthropology - in short, for ignoring
the contextual entanglements of knowledge about human beings refracted through
the minds of other human beings. A nostalgia for certainty addresses none of these
issues.
In the end, we cannot go back to an earlier theoretical moment and mode of
representation in anthropology, but not because of an international conspiracy of
feminists, postmodernists, radical subjectivists, post-structuralists and God-knows-
who-else. We cannot go back to our earlier pretensions, back to pretending we
have a view from nowhere, to a timeless ethnographic present, to theorising about
'cold' societies, to ignoring half the population during the course of our researches.
We cannot go back to the hubristic assumptions of an older anthropology on good
scientific grounds: they were inadequate to the task we set for them. These assump-
tions were so partial in so principled a fashion that we were forced to come up with
other intellectual approaches and field methods. We are now forced to confi"ont the
limits of representations, the relationships between power and knowledge, and the
irreducible ambiguity in parts of social life, precisely because it makes for better
science, despite the complexities it introduces. One might as well bewail tbe concep-
tually difficult issues concerning frames of reference that Einstein introduced into
measurement in physics.
We would do well, therefore, to move our metaphors for searching for knowledge
away from 'cargo cults'^ and towards Putnam's image of fleets of (disciplinary)
boats on the sea, which can only be modified while under sail, sharing (and stealing)
equipment and techniques between themselves, all the while shouting encourage-
ment (and abuse) at one another (Putnam 1981). Thirty years of modifying
anthropology's boat has resulted in a substantially larger, albeit more ungainly
vessel. The discipline has had some successes - weathering some crises, seeing
the term it substantially endowed with its modem meaning 'culture' gain a surprising
explanatory prominence in a variety of other discourses, while maintaining and
modestly expanding its institutional position. The issues that bedevil the discipline
are precisely the ones being centrally engaged by the thinkers whom the author
dismisses - what he offers in their place is a sterile physics envy.
Notes
1. The slippage between social construction and subjectivism is the most serious error in
this piece, but the one that would take too long a reply to set right. The error is based in
promiscuously moving between the technical and natural language senses of the term
'arbitrary'. The first sense contains the idea of partialness and non-necessity, but also is
rule-govemed and largely outside of individual consciousness and control. Language
and other symbol systems are arbitrary in this sense. The second sense contains the idea
of individual excess and subjective orientation, such as in the sense of 'the arbitrary
exercise of power.' Note that the author's attack on the 'postmodern' thesis defence
Once were Positivists: A Reply to Aya 47
(pp. 33-4) equates partialness with subjectivism in precisely this way. Ironically, the
version of 'subjectivity' being narrated (in order to be heroically defeated by the author)
exists as a spectre ofthe sort of positive knowledge the author 'knows' is there (it is sure
of itself; it seems to have no hermeneutic depth; and it is politically insulated, insofar as
a 'native' has no way of engaging with the research). Even more ironic, while the author
uses the African man's dismissal of this woman's subjective sense of his tribe as evi-
dence against her position, this man's understanding of his tribal affiliation (by blood,
land occupation, or origin myth) will also be undone by a positivist history of the sort
advocated by the author.
Not surprisingly 'cargo cults' tum out to be rather sophisticated phenomena in most
modem analyses than they are made out to be in this piece (see Billings 2002, Kaplan
1995).
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